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Ten years of conda-forge!

2 min read
conda-forge/core
The conda-forge core team

Today, 2025-04-11, marks the 10th anniversary of the conda-forge community.

Join us in this Zulip thread and share how you got involved with conda-forge, how this community has helped you, or just to show appreciation to the thousands of volunteers that make this effort possible!

To many more years! 馃帀

Security Incident with Package Uploads (CVE-2025-31484)

2 min read
conda-forge/core
The conda-forge core team

In the past few months, conda-forge has been engaging with an external security audit in collaboration with the Open Source Technology Improvement Fund (OSTIF). The full results of this audit will be made public once it is complete per OSTIF responsible disclosure policies.

During this process, OSTIF and their contractor uncovered misconfigured infrastructure which exposed the anaconda.org token for the conda-forge channel to all feedstock maintainers. The token was exposed from on or about 2025-02-10 through 2025-04-01. See our GitHub Security Advisory for more details.

Announcing the new recipe format on conda-forge

5 min read
Wolf Vollprecht
Member of conda-forge/core

The conda-forge team is excited to announce that the v1 recipe format is available on conda-forge. The v1 recipe format is a community initiative dating back over 3 years to improve the recipe format for conda packages. If you are a maintainer of a feedstock on conda-forge, you have probably dealt with meta.yaml files that conda-build utilizes. The file format has some limitations which is why the community has come together to come up with an improved version of the format: the v1 format.

CircleCI Security Incident

5 min read
conda-forge/core
The conda-forge core team

In early January 2023, CircleCI informed us that they had a large security breach where a third party had gained access to all the environment secrets stored in the service. For conda-forge, these secrets are the API token used to upload built packages to our staging area on anaconda.org and the unique token we generate for each feedstock. The feedstock tokens are used as part of our artifact staging process to ensure that only the maintainers of a given feedstock can upload packages built by that feedstock. Later in January, we were informed by CircleCI that their security breach started on December 19, 2022, with the bulk of the secrets being exfiltrated in plain text from their servers a few days later. A malicious third-party with access to these secrets could potentially upload compromised versions of any package on conda-forge in a so-called "supply chain" attack.